Invest Better in Colgate
I want to draw your attention to serious concerns about Colgate’s endowment management. Colgate hasn't updated stakeholders on endowment performance for several years. In July 2025, Colgate went a step further by removing old performance data (2021) from its website. It now links only to difficult-to-navigate financial statements more focused on university finances than investments. An independent source shows Colgate’s cumulative performance over the prior decade ranks 73rd of 119 large endowments ($1 billion or more). Colgate promotes a narrative of “conservative management” rather than disclosing and explaining its lagging investment performance. This inadequate and misleading reporting is alarming!
By contrast, Wesleyan University — similar to Colgate in size, mission, and historical investment approach — ranked 9th among the same 119 schools. Under Anne Martin (recruited from Yale, a pioneer in endowment management), Wesleyan’s endowment doubled in value over the past decade, from roughly $800 million in 2014 — similar to Colgate's at the time — to $1.58 billion (2024), $300 million ahead of Colgate's. Colgate received about $158 million in endowment gifts over this period while Wesleyan raised a comparable amount; investment performance was the primary differentiator!
Put differently: investing, not just fundraising, materially determines what a university can afford. Both schools spend roughly 5% of endowment annually (~22% of operating spending). Had Colgate matched Wesleyan’s investment returns, it could have allocated roughly $15 million more in 2025 to scholarships and programs — an amount comparable to Colgate’s Total Annual Giving (President's Report, p.13). Without improved investment management, Colgate risks falling further behind its large-endowment peers.
Wesleyan’s transparency is instructive: its investment team publishes a comprehensive annual letter detailing performance (over 1, 3, 5, 10, 15 years) and sub‑asset class returns against benchmarks, treating alumni and donors as stakeholders. Colgate, by contrast, follows a complex, alternatives‑heavy strategy lacking any demonstrated expertise, without disclosing or explaining investment performance to stakeholders. I believe Colgate should adopt a simpler, lower‑cost approach — including greater use of passive indexing — and significantly improve disclosure and oversight. Fundraising alone is unlikely to close the yawning endowment gaps with peers.
Please join me in calling for better endowment management, disclosure, and governance. Review the information below and sign the PETITION.
$325 Million
Colgate
Wesleyan
Colgate
Wesleyan
ESSENTIAL INSIGHTS
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Colgate’s average annual return of 7.4% over the past decade ranks 73rd out of 119 large endowments (those over $1 billion).
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The endowment has significantly underperformed relative to an appropriate benchmark for at least a decade.
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Colgate attributes its poor performance to downside protection, making false claims that a passive, public-equities-only indexing strategy—a fictitious approach no responsible person would advocate—would have led to declines of 40-50% during 2000-2002 and 2009, potentially causing "irreversible financial damage" to the endowment.
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Colgate also claims, without any evidence, that lower returns are due to their desire to maximize risk-adjusted returns. They base this implicitly on the less-frequent price estimates of private assets.
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Nearly 70% of the endowment is invested in alternative investments, managed by external firms.
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Performance across alternatives managers varies widely, making it crucial to select the best managers and negotiate lower fees.
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Alternative managers typically charge very high fees. Colgate does not disclose these fees, which are likely in the tens of millions each year. Poor endowment performance suggests the lack of a robust manager selection process and appropriate fee structures.
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Communication and disclosure are minimal and misleading. Colgate has not disclosed endowment performance since 2021, nor has it revealed the members of the board's investment committee.
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Many alternative managers sit on Colgate’s board, which may present conflicts of interest. For instance, it is unclear whether Colgate has invested in funds or partnerships associated with committee members.
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There is no evidence of independent appraisals or oversight as claimed. The investment committee and CIO express confidence in their approach. In an email to me, the board chair echoed the CIO's talking points, many of which are unsupported misrepresentations.
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The endowment’s reported value may be overstated, as the valuations of most private investments are merely estimates.
WHY I AM ASKING FOR YOUR SUPPORT
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I have tried, unsuccessfully, to raise my concerns over a period of years, through the Development Office, CIO, President Casey, and the Board
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I now believe only our collective voice can persuade Colgate to improve endowment practices
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No matter how much you've given in the past, helping to improve endowment management could be the biggest financial impact you will ever have on Colgate
An alternative investment is a financial asset that doesn't fall into one of the conventional investment categories like stocks, bonds, and cash (or mutual funds so comprised). Alternative investments, laden with high management fees, include private equity, hedge funds, absolute return and real assets (e.g., real estate). They are privately held (not available to all investors) and may be valued by the investment manager that owns it (not by public markets or an independent pricing service). This valuation often relies on complex models, appraisals, or recent transaction data, and can be less frequent and more subjective than pricing for publicly traded assets.
WE ARE PETITIONING FOR
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Disclosure of managers’ rankings in their respective markets, showing Colgate’s skill at hiring investment managers
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Annual performance updates, including long-term performance ranking relative to an appropriate peer group ($1B+ peers) and benchmark
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Disclosure of managers and their fees
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Regular independent (non-CIO and Investment Committee) assessments of performance and benchmark
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Course corrections when long-term performance is poor, potentially transitioning to an inexpensive, passive indexing strategy.
Please join me in asking for more transparency and accountability.